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Abstract 
Starting from the literature on the rising incidence of co-authorship in economics, choices about co-
authorship are analyzed with a theoretical model, assuming that authors optimize the returns from 
publications. Results show that co-authorship behavior depends both on the technology of the 
production of economic research and on the reward system that a researcher faces. Two pay 
structures are considered, one that is proportional to the number of authors and one that is not. The 
researchers’ heterogeneity implies a trade-off for the policy maker between the objective of effort 
maximization and the objective of selection of better researchers. The trade-off is more relevant 
when low-quality researchers choose to engage in opportunistic behavior to gain from higher-
quality collaborations. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The frequency of scientific collaboration in economics has been increasing since the early 1950s, 
resulting in a rising trend in multi-authorship (Hudson, 1996). Some explanations have been 
proposed and tested in the literature, with varying results. Basically, the growing incidence of co-
authorship is ascribed to a technological change in the production function, which fosters increasing 
opportunities for specialization. The estimates of the effect of co-authorship are referred 
alternatively to two different measures of output: a quantitative measure (e.g., the number of 
publications) or a qualitative one (e.g., the impact of each publication). Three limits in the existing 
analysis of co-authorship can be underlined. 
The first limit relies on the focus of the proposed explanations, which are concentrated only on the 
supply side of the economic research market while the demand side is often ignored. All of the 
arguments concern the shape of the production function or the evolution of input prices. Different 
returns to economic research are often considered a consequence of the structural change in 
research methods. It seems that the market for economic research is taken by assumption as a 
competitive market. 
The second limit concerns the measures that have been used to approximate the output of the 
research, which may be either qualitative or quantitative measures. The changing measure of the 
output of the research makes it difficult to compare the assumptions and the results of different 
studies.  
Finally, the lack of a theoretical framework could explain both the first and the second limit 
discussed above. By simultaneously considering the demand and the supply side of the research 
market, the conflicting effects of the technological change and the reward system can be evaluated. 
Empirical findings supporting the hypothesis of an evolution of the production function could be 
otherwise ascribed to the incentive system for economic research chosen by the research organizer. 
In the same way, the irrelevance of co-authorship on a quantitative or qualitative measure of 
research could derive from the pay structure prevailing in the market. A more comprehensive 
analysis should assess the causal relations that have to be tested and should define an approach to 
the measurement problem of the research output. 
On these bases, a theoretical model of authors’ behavior is developed in this paper that, allowing for 
a quantitative or qualitative approach to the production function, takes into account the effects of 
different pay structures. The following section reviews the main hypotheses about the rising 
incidence of co-authorship in economic research, and Section 3 discusses some specific empirical 
results. The policy implications of the different hypotheses on co-authorship are briefly summarized 
in Section 4. The model of authors’ behavior and its implications are described, respectively, in 
Section 5 and 6. Finally, Section 7 provides as a case study the analysis of Italian economists’ 
performances. Concluding remarks are found in Section 8. 
 
2. Determinants of co-authorship: a literature review 
 
The literature documents empirical findings suggesting that increasing opportunities for 
specialization can explain the rising incidence of co-authorship (McDowell and Melvin, 1983). 
Additional arguments have been tested over time. Barnett, Ault and Kaserman (1988) analyze four 
different explanations of the rising incidence of co-authorship, finding empirical support for finance 
researchers for the first three hypotheses.  
The division of labor hypothesis, tested by McDowell and Melvin, is based on the increasing 
specialization coming from the growing stock of knowledge in economics. The gain from 
collaborative work might result from harnessing skill complementarities (Hudson, 1996) or from 
the fact that “it may be cheaper for and individual to acquire new capacity (human capital) to 
produce through formal collaboration with someone who already has the requisite human capital 
than to acquire the needed knowledge de novo, personally” (Laband and Tollison, 2000). From this 
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perspective, co-authorship fosters higher quality by exploiting complementarities. Nevertheless, 
empirical analyses of the input relationship between co-authors have shown the existence of a 
substitutability relation between co-authors (Medoff, 2007). Aside from the benefits of co-
authorship, it is necessary to take into account also to the costs associated with scientific 
collaboration. Hudson (1996) underlines that collaborative work involves compromises and less 
risky approaches to economic problems. Surely, multi-authored papers involve some costs of 
coordination and communication, varying with the intensity of specialization of the researchers 
involved. Combinations of researchers with different specializations favor the division of labor and 
reduce coordination costs. Researchers with similar skills probably face higher costs of 
coordination.  
The hypothesis of a rising opportunity cost of time derives from the tightening of the “Publish or 
Perish” mechanism. The time before devoted to informal review of colleagues’ drafts is now more 
costly, and, by offering a co-authorship, a researcher can incentive the level of effort required for an 
accurate review of the paper. Also, from this perspective, collaboration guarantees more adequate 
quality standards. The diversification hypothesis comes from the uncertainty embedded in the 
editorial review process. Through co-authorship, more papers can be submitted, reducing the 
variance of the random elements of the review process. In this hypothesis, researchers choosing 
whether to produce a single authored paper or two bi-authored papers will prefer the second option 
because it reduces the variance of the random elements of the review process, which may lead to 
rejection for even good-quality papers. Then, according to the risk diversification hypothesis, a 
minimum standard of quality is pursued by authors choosing co-authorship. 
The fourth hypothesis, which concerns the relationship between co-authorship and quality, 
encompasses all the previous ones. The relation between quality and co-authorship can derive from 
the increasing need for specialization, the rising opportunity cost of time and risk diversification, as 
discussed earlier. In addition, it could be also the result of a sort of synergy where multiple 
contributors can develop results that none would have developed on his or her own. Synergy differs 
from complementarities because it can exist also between individuals with similar skills (Hudson, 
1996). The quality hypothesis has been tested using different measures, such as citation frequency 
and award winners. Laband (1987), Chung, Cox and Kim (2009) and Johnson (1997) report that the 
average quality (measured by citation frequency) is higher for co-authored papers. For Laband and 
Tollison (2000) the evidence that co-authored papers are more likely to be accepted for publication 
than single-authored papers supports the hypothesis that co-authorship gains occur in the form of 
higher-quality manuscripts. The Presser’s (1980) results for social psychology, showing that 
collaboration is associated with fewer rejections, are often cited as support for the quality 
hypothesis. In contrast, Barnett et al. (1988) do not find support for the quality hypothesis, and 
Hollis (2001) reports differentiated results: by using the journals citation index as a proxy for the 
quality of the articles, he finds that quality is positively correlated with the number of authors for a 
given author; on the other hand, total output per period per individual, measured as the sum of 
published pages weighted by quality indexes and discounted by the number of authors, is lower 
when more co-authorship occurs. For the author, this evidence supports the conclusion that, though 
collaboration is privately rational, it is not socially desirable if we care about the sum of quality 
research produced.  
A fifth hypothesis is added in this paper. The demand-side hypothesis suggests that co-authorship is 
enhanced by the academic pressure for publications, to gain high salaries and career advances, 
which results in “…an oversupply of research tied to personal and bureaucratic imperatives such as 
promotion and tenure…” (Laband and Tollison, 2003, p.166). If researchers are evaluated on the 
basis of the number of publications/citations and papers with k authors are not counted as 1/k 
papers, the benefit from co-authorship is straightforward. Researchers choosing whether to work on 
a single authored paper or on two bi-authored papers, exerting the same effort, will prefer the 
second option because it doubles the probability of an up move.  
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Taken as a whole, two explanations remain on the table. According to the quality hypothesis, 
researchers collaborate to obtain a synergy effect or risk diversification, to exploit skills 
complementarities or to obtain informal review. The demand side hypothesis stresses that the 
incentive toward co-authorship is provided from the research organization, which rewards the 
number of publication or their quality in the same way, regardless of the number of authors. The 
critical difference between the two types of explanations is in the source of the incentive to co-
author. According to the quality hypothesis, co-authorship is fostered by the technological progress 
embedded in the production function or by more binding conditions in the research market. 
Conversely, the demand side hypothesis relies solely on the pay structure the principal chooses. 
From a theoretical point of view, the two hypotheses are not alternatives because they can occur 
simultaneously.  
 
3. The prolific author, the nearness neutrality and the loneliness of the theoretician  
 
The evidence of Chung et al. (2009) discloses new possible explanations for the relationship 
between the numbers of authors and the citations frequency. The authors show that papers co-
authored with a prolific author are of higher quality (are cited more often), whereas co-authoring 
with colleagues at the same institution leads to neither higher- nor lower-quality papers. Finally, for 
purely theoretical papers, the relationship does not hold.  
The positive impact of a prolific author suggests a correlation between the quantity of papers and 
citation frequency, which produces a positive externality for the co-authors as well. Johnson (1997) 
finds that the number of citations an article receives is positively related to the number of past 
citations and publications of the author. The author refers this evidence alternatively to the intrinsic 
quality of the paper or to a bias towards citing famous people.  
More papers increase the probability to be cited, but to publish more papers than other authors, 
more competence in publishing is needed. The prolific author could be a higher-quality author 
and/or a researcher with more editorial relationship. In any case, the reputation effect of a prolific 
author has a positive effect on the measures of quality of his co-authors. Whether these measures 
correspond to the actual quality of the co-authors depends on several conditions. When more 
publications are synonymous with the higher quality of the leading author, working with a high-
quality researcher is, by itself, an indicator of higher effort and/or quality of the co-author. 
Following the reasoning of the opportunity cost hypothesis, the leading author could play the role of 
first reviewer or supervisor, ensuring a threshold level of quality of his co-author. The hypothesis of 
a “mentor-protégé” relationship has been analyzed by Laband and Piette (1995), who did not find 
empirical support for it1. However, the reputation effects of a well-known co-author can be used to 
reduce the probability of rejection. A low-quality researcher gains a lower risk of rejection, whereas 
the higher-quality researcher can sustain his prolific reputation if she has a quantity objective. 
Reciprocal convenience in co-authorship depends on the relative benefits and costs. It could be 
suitable that the lower-quality researcher takes on a part of the higher quality researcher’s costs. To 
summarize, the prolific author evidence supports two opposite explanations. In the first one, co-
authorship signals higher quality for all the co-authors and then is compatible with the quality 
hypothesis; in the second one, there is only a leading higher-quality author, whereas the others 
agree to bear part of the costs of the leader to benefit from his “good” signal. This cost/benefit 
exchange can be defined as the opportunism effect that could occur to exploit a citation bias or 
simply to produce more papers.  
The neutral effect on quality of co-authorship inside the same institution has a more complex 
explanation. It seems arguable that lower costs of coordination and communications occur when 
collaboration is established between the nearest colleagues, but at the same time, a smaller extent of 
specialization is available inside the institution than all over the world. The lower cost of 
                                                 
1
  Further investigation on the mentor-protégé relationship is provided by Mixon (1997). 
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coordination should increase the number of co-authored papers inside the institution, whereas fewer 
occasions for division of labor should decrease the number of co-authored papers. The two opposite 
effects can result in a frequency of co-authorship with no statistically significant difference inside 
and outside the institution.  
If the opportunity cost hypothesis holds, a review implicitly paid through the co-authorship is more 
likely to occur inside an institution, where nearness eases the revision process. The benefit of co-
authorship increases the probability of collaboration in the same direction of the lower cost of 
coordination. The same holds for the risk diversification hypothesis and the synergy hypothesis. 
More co-authorship and higher quality should be observed within a single institution. Then, the 
opportunity cost hypothesis is not compatible with the evidence of neutrality, and neither are the 
synergy effect or the risk diversification hypothesis. Because the evidence of Chung et al. show that 
co-authoring with colleagues at the same institution leads to neither higher- nor lower-quality 
papers, the previous arguments show that quality neutrality within an institution is compatible with 
the quality/specialization explanation.  
Finally, Chung et al. report that for purely theoretical papers, the relationship between co-authorship 
and quality does not hold. Barnett et al. (1988), assuming that a theoretical paper is not favorable to 
the division of labor, support the specialization hypothesis with the evidence that the number of co-
authors is higher for empirical and theoretical/empirical papers than for purely theoretical papers. In 
the opportunity cost hypothesis, no difference between empirical and theoretical papers should 
arise. The same would be true for the risk diversification hypothesis and for the synergy hypothesis. 
The loneliness of the theoretician rejects the idea that collaboration implies synergies and confirms 
that the higher quality of co-authored papers derives from the specialization if the division of labor 
is more difficult in theoretical papers. 
In conclusion, no evidence supports the positive quality effect of synergies in co-authorship. It 
seems reasonable that the positive relationship between quality and scientific collaboration arises in 
fields where growing specialization implies some skills complementarities or when higher-quality 
authors collaborate to reduce the opportunity cost of revisions. Conversely, the relationship between 
quality and collaboration breaks down when opportunist behavior occurs between an author of high 
quality and a lower-quality researcher, if their common objective is to maximize the number of 
publications they produce.  
 
4. Research policy implications: the quantity/quality approach 
 
Scientific collaboration is often incentivized by promoting research networks and researchers 
aggregation. When the macro level is concerned, collaboration has additional advantages because it 
stimulates the circulation of ideas and the transfer of knowledge. From the micro perspective, the 
only substantial argument for a causal relation between quality and collaboration is the one about 
specialization and complementarities. Should the individual reward system incentivize or punish the 
collaborations? The answer partly relies on the objective of an individual reward system. It can be 
used for the selection of the better researchers or to obtain the maximum results from the researcher. 
When the maximum result is concerned, it seems reasonable to assume that the main aim of a 
research institution is to improve research quality rather than quantity. Sauer (1988), estimating the 
earning functions of 140 academic economists, shows that monetary return to research quality is 
measurably large2.  
The researcher’s output can be interpreted from both a quantitative perspective and a qualitative 
one, focusing on the number of papers or the citations produced, respectively. From the quantity 
perspective, Durden and Perri (1995), Landry et al. (1996) find that the number of total publications 
is positively related to the number of co-authored papers, whereas McDowell and Smith (1992) find 
no significant result. Nevertheless, the quantitative measure can be improved with quality 
                                                 
2
  See Coupé (2004) for a more detailed overview of research about labour market of academic economists.  
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refinements concerning the paper diffusion and its relative citations. Until now, the better available 
measure for the research quality is the h-index, based on the numbers of citations for each 
publication. The h-index is an acceptable measure of the quality of one paper, if a cited paper has 
been more useful to other authors than a paper that is uncited. The “dry holes”, defined by Laband 
and Tollison (2003) as publications that subsequently received no citations, have shown a stable 
incidence in the last decades. Simply compared with the rising incidence in co-authorship, the 
constant incidence of dry holes shows that more co-authorship does not reduce the fraction of 
uncited papers. This conclusion should reject the quality hypothesis and the other quality related 
hypothesis (opportunity cost, specialization and risk diversification). 
The uncertainty regarding the better measure of output research suggests the opportunity of a 
quantitative/qualitative approach to the analysis of researcher’s choices concerning co-authorship. If 
a production function is defined as the relationship between effort and the number of 
publications/citations, a well-defined incentive scheme will lead to a framework where the efficient 
use of researchers’ effort gives the maximum amount of publications/citations. 
 
5. Choices of co-authorship: a theoretical model 
 
A paper can be produced with the effort of the ith researcher or with the combined effort of the ith 
researcher and other k co-authors. If individual effort has decreasing returns in the papers 
production function, the co-authorship has a straightforward advantage: each added author has 
higher productivity. Nevertheless, co-authorship brings an additional cost in the coordination of 
reciprocal effort and production.  
Consider a production function of publications, with decreasing returns of effort. Because a single 
authored paper is always possible (and actually produced), the additive function reported in (1.a) 
seems to adequately fit the framework. 
ˆ
            with 1,...,     and 0 -1i iP h e kh e i N k N= + = ≤ ≤ ,    (1.a) 
where P is the number of papers produced by the ith researcher, ei is his effort, eˆ  is the estimated 
effort of the k co-authors and h is a skill parameter. Co-authorship has constant returns. To simplify 
the algebra, assume that the author estimates that each co-author will put the same effort he will 
reserve for the research, leading to the equation (1 )i iP k h e= + . Furthermore, this assumption turns 
the original perfect substitutability between the agent’s effort and the others’ contribution into 
imperfect complementarities between individual effort and the total number of authors. This 
formulation does not exactly represent the skill complementarities of the specialization hypothesis, 
which would imply a complementary relationship between effort of author i and that of author j. 
More generally, this production function shows the scale economies arising from collaboration.  
The production function of the researcher can be expressed in terms of the output quality Qi, where 
more quality can be obtained by exerting more effort or from the contribution of additional 
researchers. In what follows, analytical implications will be referred to the quantity production 
function, but the same conclusions hold when considering (1 )i iQ k h e= + . 
There is a fixed cost of coordination for each co-author (c) and a constant disutility of effort (d). As 
a first step, the behavior of the researcher facing a non-proportional pay structure is described. If the 
reward provider offers a reward Φ , based on the volume of publications/citations, the maximizing 
researcher will face the problem in (2.a). 
,
max   (1 )             s.t.  0 1
i
i i
e k
k h e de ck k NΦ + − − ≤ ≤ −       (2.a) 
Due to the constant returns to co-authorship, a corner solution arises depending on whether the 
marginal revenue of coordination is higher or lower than its cost.  
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     (3.a) 
A researcher will co-author with all of the other N-1 researchers, when a lower coordination cost or 
a higher reward is found. Otherwise, when the research organizer offers low rewards, the better 
choice is to put lower effort into single-authored publications.   
If researchers’ heterogeneity is introduced, different co-authors’ combinations have to be 
considered. Assume that there are two types of researchers: N
H
 authors with higher ability h
H
 in 
production of publications, and N
L
 authors with lower ability h
L
. The ith low-type author 
( with 1,..., Li N= ) can choose k
Li
 co-authors with the same ability and/or k
Hi
 with higher ability. The 
same holds for jth high ability author ( with 1,..., Hj N= ), where k
Hj is the number of his high-type 
co-authors, and k
Lj his low type co-authors. The paper production functions for the two types of 
researchers are described in (1.b). 
(1 )          
(1 )          
i Li L i Hi H j
j Hj H j Lj L i
P k h e k h e
P k h e k h e
= + +
= + +
        (1.b) 
If the high-quality authors are characterized by more specialized skills, the division of labor is more 
fruitful than for the lower types. With similar skills, the high-quality authors collaborate to 
compensate for a high opportunity cost of time. The low-quality authors collaborate for risk 
diversification if they face a relative lower cost of coordination (as in the collaborations inside the 
same institution). Consequently, it can be assumed that, when facing the same cost of coordination, 
the higher-quality author will collaborate, whereas the lower-quality author will not. In the case of 
homogeneity, the convenience to collaborate emerges when 2 2 2h N dcφ > . With heterogeneous 
skills it can be assumed that the higher-quality author has a productivity h
H
 that ensures 
that 2 2 2Hh dcφ > , whereas for the low-ability author it is true that 2 2 2Lh dcφ ≤ . If the marginal reward 
for papers is the same and is equal toΦ, each type of author faces the maximization problem 
described in (2.b) 
, ,
, ,
max   (1 ) ( )      s.t.  0 1 
                                                                                                  0
max    (1
i Li Hi
j Lj Hj
Li L i Hi H j i Hi Li Li L
e k k
Hi H
e k k
k h e k h e de c k k k N
k N
φ φ
φ
+ + − − + ≤ ≤ −
≤ ≤
+ ) ( )     s.t.  0 1;  
                                                                                                  0
Hj H j Lj L i j Hj Lj Hj H
Lj L
k h e k h e de c k k k N
k N
φ+ − − + ≤ ≤ −
≤ ≤
  (2.b) 
Solutions to the respective maximization problems must be compatible because when an author of a 
given type wants to collaborate with the other type, the other type should consider the collaboration 
an optimization choice. Two possible solutions arise.      If 
2 2 2L Lh N dcφ >  
2 2 2
* * *
2
2 2 2
* * *
2
,    k =N -1,    k =N         
4
,   k =N -1,    k =N       
4
L L
i Li L Hi H
H H
j Hj H Lj L
h N
e
d
h N
e
d
φ
φ

=


=

 
            (3.b) 
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If 2 2 2L Lh N dcφ ≤
2 2
* * *
2
2 2 2
* * *
2
,        k =0,    k =N         
4
,   k =N -1,    k =0      
4
L
i Li Hi H
H H
j Hj H Lj
h
e
d
h N
e
d
φ
φ

=


=

 
If the second condition occurs, the low-ability researchers are rationed because they would 
appreciate the collaboration with high-quality authors. In this situation, only the high-quality 
authors would collaborate. If the first condition occurs, both types of authors would collaborate with 
all the available authors (high or low). Notably, according to the first hypothesis, each type of 
author will put the maximum effort in the production of publications, whereas if the second 
condition occurs, only the high-quality authors will maximize their effort.  
 
5.1 The opportunistic researcher 
 
Discussion about the different benefits and costs of co-authorship has highlighted that opportunistic 
behavior can justify the emergence of collaboration between authors of different types, as well as 
when costs and benefits would not allow fruitful collaborations. In analytical terms, this would be 
the case when the low-ability author, rationed by the optimization choices of high-quality 
researchers, exploits all the gains deriving from exchange, bearing the coordination costs of the 
higher-quality author to increase his own total production. The “cost assumption” hypothesis 
implies that the opportunistic, low-ability researcher bears all the costs associated with coordination 
and communication in co-authorship, taking on all compromises would need to agree with the high-
quality author. The “grin and bear it” situation implies that the higher-quality authors have no 
coordination cost, whereas the low-quality authors bear a doubled cost, as in (2.c). 
, ,
, ,
max   (1 ) (2 )      s.t.  0 1 
                                                                                                  0
max    (1
i Li Hi
j Lj Hj
Li L i Hi H j i Hi Li Li L
e k k
Hi H
e k k
k h e k h e de c k k k N
k N
φ φ
φ
+ + − − + ≤ ≤ −
≤ ≤
)                  s.t.  0 1;  
                                                                                                  0
Hj H j Lj L i j Hj Hj H
Lj L
k h e k h e de ck k N
k N
φ+ + − − ≤ ≤ −
≤ ≤
  (2.c) 
Solutions to the maximization for different types of authors are shown in (3.c). 
If 2 2 2L Lh N dcφ >  
2 2 2
* * *
2
2 2 2
* * *
2
,    k =N -1,    k =N         
4
,   k =N -1,    k =N       
4
L L
i Li L Hi H
H H
j Hj H Lj L
h N
e
d
h N
e
d
φ
φ

=


=

 
            (3.c) 
If 2 2 2L Lh N dcφ ≤
2 2
* * *
2
2 2 2
* * *
2
,        k =0,    k =N         
4
,   k =N -1,    k =N       
4
L
i Li Hi H
H H
j Hj H Lj L
h
e
d
h N
e
d
φ
φ

=


=

 
Unlike the previous case, the low-ability researchers are never rationed, and the high-ability authors 
agree to collaborate with them. Low-ability researchers, taking on the coordination costs of high-
ability researchers, are able to remove rationing when collaborating with high-quality authors. As 
for the collaborations among low-ability authors, they occur only when conditions concerning 
benefits and costs of co-authorship are favorable. 
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5.2 How many times do the authors have to be counted? 
 
In the reward system previously considered, the reward provider offers a reward Φ , based on the 
volume of publications of each researcher, and the reward does not differ between single-authored 
and multi-authored publications. For multi-authored papers, the same amount of premium is 
assigned to all co-authors, and the total expenditure is multiplied for the number of co-authors. A 
cheaper system would be established by a payment proportional to the number of co-authors. Note 
that the reward is not necessarily represented by an amount of money, so the expenditure argument 
is not always true. Nevertheless, Sauer (1988), analyzing the returns to co-authorship, estimates a 
weight for co-authored research in the earning function equal to 0.56, indicating that some form of 
discounting takes place. In contrast, Moore et al. (2001) find no discounting for co-authorship, 
whereas McDowell and Smith (1992) show that departments make no difference between co-
authored and single-authored papers when deciding promotions rather then salaries.  
Assume that the reward is (1 )H Lk kφ + +  for all the i and j authors. With the production function in 
(1.b), the objective functions for the low- and high-quality authors are respectively shown in (2.d). 
, ,
(1 )
max   ( )      s.t.  0 1 (1 ) (1 )
                                                                                                  0
i Li Hi
Hi H jLi L i
i Hi Li Li L
e k k
Li Hi Li Hi
Hi
k h ek h e
de c k k k N
k k k k
k
φφ +
+ − − + ≤ ≤ −
+ + + +
≤ ≤
, ,
(1 )
max  ( )   s.t.  0 1 (1 ) (1 )
                                                                                                  0
j Lj Hj
H
Hj H j Lj L i
j Hj Lj Hj H
e k k
Lj Hj Lj Hj
Lj L
N
k h e k h e
de c k k k N
k k k k
k N
φ φ+
+ − − + ≤ ≤ −
+ + + +
≤ ≤
  (2.d) 
Three different solutions arise, but only one is characterized by choices of collaborations that are 
mutually compatible. This equilibrium is characterized by no collaboration at all. Indeed, when 
high-quality authors would collaborate with low-quality authors, the latter are optimizing with no 
collaboration. High-quality authors are then rationed. Conversely, when low-quality authors would 
collaborate with the high-quality ones, the better choice for the high-quality authors is zero 
collaboration and the low-quality authors are rationed. Then,  
2 2
* * *
2
2 2
* * *
2
,    k =0,    k =0        
4
,   k =0,    k =0      
4
L
i Li Hi
H
j Hj Lj
h
e
d
h
e
d
φ
φ

=


=

        (3.d) 
When the reward is proportional to the number of co-authors, co-authorship is never convenient, 
and each type of author exerts lower effort. However, given that h
H
> h
L
, the high-quality author 
always produces more publication than the low-quality one. Moreover, it can be shown that with 
opportunistic behavior the same equilibrium occurs.  
 
6. The optimal reward system 
 
The behavioral model above shows different results from co-authorship, depending on the reward 
system structure and on the ratio between premiums and costs associated with publications. At the 
same time, the optimal design of the reward system depends on the objectives pursued by the 
research organizer providing rewards.  
If the aim of the principal is to obtain the maximum amount of effort from each researcher, the 
proportional reward system is surely not adequate. The maximum amount of effort is obtainable 
only with a non-proportional reward that is sufficiently high to incentivize all of the possible co-
authorships. If 2 2 2L Lh N dcφ > , all of the authors will exert the maximum effort and will collaborate 
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with all of the other, N-1, authors. This result is insensible to the cost exchange hypothesis. If N
L
 is 
sufficiently high, also in the case of low rewards, the principal can obtain the maximum effort, so a 
research community with many low-type authors will exhibit a great bulk of publications. 
Conversely, with N
L
 being relatively low, the reward provider has to put a higher premium to obtain 
the same result. However, when the objective of the policy maker is to maximize effort, the total 
papers produced by the low- and high-quality authors will be same, and no selection can be made 
on the basis of the number of publications. 
Consequently, if the reward provider wants to select the best authors for the promotion, the system 
with non-proportional rewards is not adequate if rewards are relatively high. To observe different 
amounts of publications between low- and high-quality authors, the principal must choose a reward 
proportional to the number of co-authors, with the obvious disadvantage of reducing for all 
researchers the optimal effort. Otherwise, if a non-proportional reward is offered, a relatively low 
reward has to be set. When the condition 2 2 2L Lh N dcφ ≤  is verified, high-quality authors maximize 
their effort, co-authoring with other researchers of the same type, both when the coordination costs 
are on their shoulders and when opportunistic researchers bear the doubled costs of coordination to 
remove the rationing on co-authorship. Then, the low-ability researchers always choose a level of 
effort lower than the higher ones and produce fewer publications. The result is that the research 
organizer maximizes the effort of the high-quality researchers and is able to distinguish between the 
two types if the selection is based on the amount of publications.  
The selection objective can be pursued by fixing a threshold level for publications. Notably, the 
high-quality researcher will publish more than the low-quality researcher, also when opportunistic 
behavior occurs, but, in this latter case, more collaborations and more papers are produced with 
respect to the situation without a cost exchange. Then, the principal should take into account the 
opportunistic behavior when setting a minimum amount of publications to choose the better 
researchers. When setting the threshold for publications, the research organizer must select the one 
suggested by the equilibrium where all of the low-quality researchers try to remove the rationing 
about collaboration with high-quality researchers. If he decides for the lower threshold 
corresponding to the rationed authors in (3.b), for the low authors who are willing to support a 
doubled cost of coordination, it will be easier to win the selection. 
Finally, when the reward system is used to give a career move, it is likely that higher rewards are 
established for those over the standard. Again, rewards that are too high incentivize too much 
collaboration, making selection no longer possible. When different rewards are fixed for different 
types of researchers, the highest reward must be sufficiently low, so that  the low types choose a 
lower level of effort in equilibrium.  
 
7. Italian economists and the infinite reform: a case study 
 
Italian academics are involved in political debates concerning the optimal design of higher 
education. More specifically, some Italian economists support the policy maker attention on the 
career mechanism, which is not considered adequate to put the best researchers in the better 
positions. 
From the previous discussion about the researcher reward system, a trade-off between policy maker 
objectives has emerged. Maximizing the effort of all the employed researchers is a result that could 
compromise the possibility of selecting between high- and low-quality researchers. Conversely, the 
perfect discrimination achievable with a reward proportional to the number of authors will reduce 
the effort among all types of researchers. If the Italian system is unable to ensure the appropriate 
selection, it would at least maximize the overall effort. Otherwise, it would be correctly classified as 
being totally inefficient.  
In the simplified model above, collaboration is incentivized by a relatively high reward for low 
types or by a relatively high reward for high types. When collaboration is spread among all authors, 
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the maximum effort is spent by all types of researchers, all of whom produce the same amount of 
publications. 
Academic careers in Italy have always been determined by peer judgment, characterized by very 
broad criteria, where no direct publication reward exists beyond promotion, which leads to higher 
wages. If incentives to publish exist, they rely only in the relatively higher reward for those who 
have been positively evaluated for higher positions. For this reward combination, the co-authorship 
model above forecasts the same amount of publications for low-quality and high-quality authors 
and a pooling between the two types. 
To verify the existence of a pooling among Italian economists, two categories of professors are 
considered: the full professors and those still considered of “lower quality” (associate professors)3. 
Instead of using a simple number of publications, the quality refinement provided by the h-index 
has been used to classify their research production. Fig.1 shows the distribution of Italian professors 
of economics per academic position and the h-index score.  
 
Fig.1 - Italian professors of economics per academic position and h-index score (%) – 2010 
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Although more associate professors have low scores and more full professors have high scores, a 
threshold h-value distinguishing full and associate professors does not emerge. It could be argued 
that the criteria for promotions to full professor have consistently evolved through time so that the 
current full professors’ distribution reflects different thresholds growing over time. To analyze this 
argument, the population of full professors has been divided into two groups: in the first group (the 
“old professors”, 194 individuals) there are all the economists that were already full professors on 
12/31/2001; the group of “new professors” includes those who have won promotions since 2002 
(124 individuals). Fig. 2 shows the relative distributions.  
 
 
 
                                                 
3
  Data are from the archive of the Italian Ministry of University and Research (MIUR), updated on September 
2010, for professors belonging to the “Economics” area (Economia Politica, SECS-P/01). 
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Fig.2 - Italian full professors of economics per h-index score, before and after 2001 (%) 
-0,02
0
0,02
0,04
0,06
0,08
0,1
0,12
0,14
0,16
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
h index
fre
qu
en
c
ie
s
old new
 
 
The average score of the new professors is slightly higher (+7.4%) than the respective value of the 
older ones and the same is true for the median value (from 5 to 6), but the “new” professors are 
distributed along the full range of scores not too much differently from the “old”. It seems difficult 
to affirm that a threshold score higher than zero has been fixed, at least for the last decade. 
The absence of a threshold level distinguishing between low and high types corresponds to similar 
amounts of publications, which is exactly the expected result for a system with a positive reward for 
high types and no publication rewards for low types, which is found in the Italian research system. 
As stressed above, this arrangement fosters collaboration between and within types and maximizes 
the effort of each researcher, giving up the sorting between different types of authors. The 
meritocratic change that someone invokes should probably improve the individual rewards for some 
economists, but it would not necessarily yield more productive Italian economic scholarship than 
before. 
Further evidence derives from the analysis of the same individuals with another evaluation system. 
In the proportional reward system, each publication should be evaluated as 1/k publication and the 
same should be true for its quality indicator, which, under the h-index metric, is the number h of 
papers, each of which has been cited by others at least h times. A proportional evaluation system 
should attribute to each researcher the number h/k of papers, each of which has been cited by others 
at least h/k times. This adjusted version of the h-index has been calculated for Italian full professors 
of economics, whose distribution is showed in Fig. 3. A more skewed distribution arises when 
Italian economists are ranked using proportional evaluation4. Italian economists are more 
homogeneous when co-authorship is taken into account. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
  The distribution of associate professors, which is not shown, has similar characteristics.  
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Fig.3 - Italian full professors of economics per h-index score and adjusted h-index score (%) -2010 
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Fig.4 - Italian full professors of economics per adjusted h-index score, before and after 2001 (%) 
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Moreover, a growing trend in co-authorship emerges from the comparison between “old” and 
“new” professors. The standard h-index in fig. 2 shows a positive difference between “old” and 
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“new” professors, both in the average score and its median value. When considering the adjusted 
indicator, the average score of the new professors is still higher than the respective value of the 
older ones, but the increase is limited to 2.6%. This trend confirms the results of Marcuzzo and 
Zacchia (2007), who show a higher number of co-authored papers for Italian economists publishing 
in core journals. Notably, going from the group of old professors to the group of new professors, the 
median value of the adjusted h-index decreases (from 5 to 3), whereas the standard h-index shows a 
higher median value. Although the h-index distribution shows a similar shape between old and new 
professors, the adjusted h-index shows a more skewed distribution for the new professors than for 
the oldest ones (fig. 4). A positive trend in co-authorship emerges from the comparisons among 
Italian full professors of economics, confirming that the current reward system fosters collaboration 
or simply follows the general trend of specialization. 
 
8. Concluding remarks 
 
The rising incidence in co-authorship in economics raises a question concerning the policy 
implications for research organization: should the research organizer incentivize or punish the 
collaborations? The answer depends on what the policy maker wants to obtain. The model 
developed in this paper shows that the maximum amount of effort is obtainable with a non-
proportional reward sufficiently high to incentive all of the possible co-authorships. Conversely, 
when priority is assigned to the selection of the better researchers, the principal must choose a 
reward proportional to the number of coauthors, with the obvious disadvantage of reducing for all 
researchers the optimal effort. Otherwise, if a non-proportional reward is offered, a relatively low 
reward has to be set.  
The trade off between effort maximization and researchers selection has different effects on 
incentive to coauthor. Researchers choose to coauthor as more as possible if the pay structure does 
not discount for the number of authors, while the opposite occurs with a proportional reward. These 
results arise within a quality hypothesis, where the papers production function shows scale 
economies in co-authorship. The quantity/quality approach shifts the attention from the technology 
in the production of research to the market demand, where different equilibrium arise whether 
considering the research market or the researchers market.  
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